Andrew Johnson's Presidential Reconstruction

“I hereby grant to all persons who have, directly or indirectly, participated in the existing rebellion, except as hereafter excepted, amnesty and pardon, with restoration of all rights of property, except as to slaves and except in cases where legal proceedings under the laws of the United States providing for the confiscation of property of persons engaged in rebellion have been instituted; but upon the condition, nevertheless, that every such person shall take and subscribe the following oath (or affirmation) and thenceforward keep and maintain said oath inviolate and which oath shall be registered for permanent preservation and shall be tenor and effect following, to wit.” Andrew Johnson May 29, 1865. 

Welcome to Civics and Coffee. My name is Alycia and I am a self-professed history nerd. Each week, I am going to chat about a topic on U.S history and give you both the highlights and occasionally break down some of the complexities in history; and share stories you may not remember learning in high school. All in the time it takes to enjoy a cup of coffee. 

INTRO MUSIC

Hey everyone, welcome back. 

How do you heal a fractured nation? That was the question facing Andrew Johnson when he ascended to the presidency after Lincoln’s assassination. With Union victory in hand, the next step was to lay out the conditions for previously seceded states to rejoin the United States. Would they have to pay a fine? Would Confederate leaders be imprisoned for treason? And what role should newly emancipated Black Americans play in rebuilding this new republic? 

With Congress in recess, President Andrew Johnson acted alone in deciding the initial terms and conditions of reunification. There was some hope early on that Johnson, who had previously indicated he thought secession to be an act of treason, would lay down a forceful but fair reconstruction process; however, by the time Congress returned in December of 1865, those hopes were gone. 

So this week I am diving into presidential reconstruction. What was it? How did it favor the South? And why did it prompt a backlash from Congress? 

Grab your cup of coffee, peeps. Let’s do this. 

Historians tend to agree that while Abraham Lincoln was the right man for the moment in 1861, Andrew Johnson was the exact opposite in 1865. Johnson was uncompromising in his views and lacked the political acumen necessary to successfully navigate post-war tensions. As historian Elizabeth Varon observes Johnson is quote: “viewed to have been a rigid, dictatorial racist who was unable to compromise or to accept a political reality at odds with his own ideas,” end quote. Johnson simply lacked the political skill set to properly navigate the complexities of reconstruction. But in the first few weeks of his administration, Johnson’s true intentions and ideas were unknown. Johnson previously stated he would be Moses for the newly freed black Americans and indicated early support for black suffrage. 

Both Black and White Americans wrote to the new president, asking for his help and stewardship in safeguarding the rights and privileges of the newly emancipated men, women, and children. Those who had remained loyal to the union asked the president to make efforts to establish a new South that would protect everyone’s interests. For them, this meant extending and guaranteeing the right to the franchise for black men. As everyone would soon learn, Johnson was of a completely different mindset.  

Despite his prior comments that secession was an act of treason, Andrew Johnson sought no reparations or legal ramifications for the states who had previously left the union. In his initial proclamation announcing his plans for reconstruction in May 1865, Johnson granted amnesty to a significant majority of former Confederate actors, as long as they were willing to take an oath of loyalty to the United States. 

While the proclamation excluded individuals such as Confederate army officials who held the rank of Colonel, or anyone who resigned their commissions in the U.S. Army to evade duty, he did include an option of granting individual pardons. All told, Johnson issued over 13,000 pardons including shockingly the former Confederate president Jefferson Davis. According to historian and Johnson biographer Annette Gordon Reed, Johnson approached the reconstruction process as more of a quote “restoration rather than reconstruction” end quote. Johnson sought to restore the union as quickly as possible, he quote “was determined to achieve his goal of the speedy reincorporation of the southern states all by himself,” end quote. 

In spite of everything he said about treason, Johnson was a firm believer in state’s rights. In explaining his thought process to General John A. Logan in May of 1865, Johnson said quote: “There is no such thing as reconstruction. These states have not gone out of the union, therefore reconstruction is unnecessary,” end quote. Like many of his contemporaries, Johnson held incredibly racist views and did not think black Americans should play any role in reconstruction. He remained focused on putting things back just as they were, with the exception of slavery. As Reed argues, it was Johnson’s racial views that drove his inaction when it came to extending the franchise to black Americans. 

Johnson’s reconstruction plan included leveraging his constitutional authority by selecting provisional governors in the former Confederate states who were charged with calling state constitutional conventions. During these conventions, leaders were expected to acknowledge the 13th Amendment’s abolition of slavery and include a provision denouncing secession. Once complete, the states could send representatives to Washington to be readmitted to the union. There were no requirements to establish voting rights for black Americans; no parameters prohibiting former confederate leaders from serving in legislative positions. In an article evaluating Johnson’s decisions surrounding provisional governors, Ryan Swanson argues that Johnson adopted a laissez-faire approach once the governors were appointed, simply hoping they would do the right thing and build a suitable government. 

Annette Gordon Reed argues that Johnson hid behind his support of state’s rights to avoid the issue of extending the franchise. In her analysis, Reed asserts the same language that Johnson used to choose provisional governors could have been used to quote “explain why it was necessary to expand the franchise to qualified blacks,” end quote. Johnson avoided political risk when selecting his provisional governors, choosing med who he knew would hold the line on the question of black political and social rights. Reed highlights that Johnson’s choices confirmed his dedication to ensuring the South remained a quote “white man’s government,” end quote. To accomplish this, Johnson knew he had to move quickly. 

In a sign that he was eager to push through his plans for reconstruction before Congress could interfere, Johnson selected 7 provisional governors  in his first 41 days in office. In making his selection, Johnson chose individuals who had both demonstrated a commitment to the union and done so at some personal cost, but who also shared his racial beliefs. Initially, many chose to reserve judgment about the appointments, believing Johnson was acting in the best interest of the country. There was some concern, however, over the speed at which Johnson was choosing said governors. Some newspapers charged that Johnson appeared too eager to readmit states formerly in rebellion, a sentiment at least a few contemporary politicians shared. Despite their reservations, most remained in support of the president, believing he would champion a strong reconstruction plan. 

In the article analyzing Johnson’s decisions about and oversight over the provisional governors, Ryan Swanson asserts that after Johnson appointed the governors, he failed to provide specific guidance. This, Swanson argues, expedited the failure of presidential reconstruction. While Johnson provided some general guidance between June and December of 1865, Swanson argues it was not comprehensive nor forceful enough. Further, when the provisional governors failed to heed the president’s advice, Swanson writes, Johnson did not do enough to address the slight. 

Swanson points to Johnson’s weak approach to suggesting an extension of black voting rights. Facing political pressure to come out in support of black suffrage, Johnson wrote to the provisional governor of Mississippi suggesting ways the state could extend the franchise, writing quote: “If you could extend the elective franchise to all persons of color who can read the constitution of the United States in English and write their names, and to all persons of color who own real estate valued at not less than two-hundred and fifty dollars and pay taxes thereon, you could completely disarm the adversary and set an example other states will follow,” end quote. Mississippi did not move forward with extending voting rights to its black residents. 

Instead of engaging in further dialogue with Mississippi, Johnson instead took a roundabout approach and went to the press. In his conversation with George Stearns, Johnson indicated he wanted to see a gradual approach to extending black suffrage. In his remarks, Johnson stated that giving voting rights to those who served in the army could come first. Then, provisions could be made to extend it further. Again, none of the governors listened. This only served to further undermine Johnson’s stewardship of the reconstruction process. 

As Swanson explains, quote: “In failing to broker some sort of compromise on suffrage, Johnson increased the odds that his reconstruction plan would be wiped away when Congress reconvened,” end quote. And lest you think, dear listener, that Johnson was perhaps a mild politician unable to be forceful and direct in his wishes, you would be incorrect. 

Johnson had no problem being very specific about his desired outcomes on issues that mattered to him, such as war debt. In his parameters for re-joining the union, Johnson made clear that in addition to pledging loyalty to the United States and acknowledging the 13th Amendment, former Confederate states also had to pay off their war debt. Clearly, Johnson was able to draw a line in the sand, despite his professed beliefs of state’s rights. In failing to push for additional conditions for readmission, Johnson made it clear that he had little interest in being the quote-unquote Moses for newly emancipated black Americans. 

Johnson’s leniency gave Republicans in Congress pause and several Republican leaders voiced their concerns about the lack of Congressional involvement, hoping the President would either call a special session of Congress to discuss and debate the parameters for Confederate states to be readmitted or wait until Congress was back in session in December so that they could play a larger role in crafting the reconstruction policy. Johnson chose to do neither, prompting a tense confrontation in December when the 39th Congress refused to seat the newly approved southern delegates. 

Instead, representative Thaddeus Stevens announced a resolution to establish a joint committee on Reconstruction, arguing partially, quote: “dead states cannot restore their own existence,” end quote. The committee, consisting of nine members of the house and six senators, would be tasked with investigating the political and social conditions in the southern states seeking readmission to the United States. Passing by a vote of 133 to 36, the measure signified the start of Congress’ attempts at recharting reconstruction’s course and launching what came to be known as radical reconstruction. 

President Johnson and Congress became locked in a battle over how reconstruction should proceed, with Congress passing a series of laws and introducing new amendments aimed at establishing and protecting newly freed Black Americans’ civil and social rights. This included passing the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which became the first law to be enacted over the veto of a sitting president. Tensions continued to escalate between the president and Congress, eventually leading to Johnson’s impeachment in 1868. 

In his attempt to answer the question of how to heal a fractured nation, President Andrew Johnson came out on the side of - pretend like it didn’t happen. His decision to largely forgive the southern states, without putting any conditions on the bad actors who triggered the war to begin with meant that reconstruction was over shortly after it began. And black Americans would continue to reside in the country as second-class citizens, falling short of the American ideal. 

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Thanks, peeps. I’ll see you next week.

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